California Violence Intervention Program
Local Evaluation Report
Executive Summary

The City of San Bernardino Violence Intervention Program (VIP) is evidence based violence reduction strategy that consist of merging two national violence reduction models—Boston’s Operation Ceasefire (Focused Deterrence) & Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Street Outreach Supportive Services strategy—with the goal to respond & reduce community violence, specifically group related violence by 5 percent each year. Through the City’s community-based organizations supportive service contractors, the VIP further aimed to reduce recidivism among program participants by 20 percent. The VIP represents the City’s first coordinated effort to reduce gun violence citywide utilizing street outreach team and a focused deterrence law enforcement strategy. The program’s efforts were to improve outcomes for young people at highest risk of violence, and to strengthen trust-based working partnerships between the community and police were also the City’s first attempt. As a result of this new approach to address violence in the City, the program faced several challenges and barriers.

The first and most significant barrier was a strong political will against the program all together. In 2016 the City began to explore national violence reduction strategies and landed on the Oakland-Stockton Ceasefire model developed by the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC) and entered a three-year research & evaluation, technical assistance & training contract with CPSC. The program was adopted by a City Manager in office during the first half of 2017 but no longer during the planning or hiring of City’s Violence Intervention Program Manager. In addition, it was “championed” by a Mayor facing re-election and supported by a Chief of Police seeking to remain in position after the November 2018 election. The results were not conducive to the incumbent Mayor and the existing Chief of Police retired soon thereafter and the Assistant Chief became Acting Chief of Police at the beginning of 2019.

While the Board of State & Community Corrections issued California Violence Intervention & Prevention grant program awards in April 2018, the City of San Bernardino did not approve and release the City’s VIP Request for Proposals (RFP) until July 2018. The RFP remained open for 45 days and contractors were selected by September 2018. However, due to political maneuvering, the City decided to issue program contracts to local community-based non-profit service providers after the November 2018 election. As a result of the political dynamic, the program had an eight-month delay. As an effort to avoid further delays such as identifying and hiring critical staff, the City notified the selected contractors of award and allowed for the hiring process to begin. While the program started later than anticipated, the team hit the ground running in January 2019.
The second significant barrier was the San Bernardino Police Officers Association (POA) lack of support for the strategy. The City force as a whole has extremely limited capacity but it is clear the department did not have physical capacity to implement a focused deterrence strategy in partnership with culturally competent local community-based service providers utilizing individuals with a history of gang violence and prior justice involvement. The program had the initial support of the now retired Chief of Police and department wide support began to take shape. Their limited practical-physical capacity stems from the City going through bankruptcy in 2012, and in addition to significant department budget reductions the City Police department experienced an exodus of police officers and middle management. More recently, the 2018/2019 fiscal year involved a budget deficit of $11.2 million dollars which forced the department to cut 13 vacant police positions and 47 civilian positions.

In addition to a significant reduction in police officers, shortly after the bankruptcy the department eliminated all specialized units such as gang, narcotics, and vice units. This led to an unfocused reactive police department, transferred all sworn officers to patrol units, and inadvertently produced low officer moral. Despite these setbacks, in the second quarter of 2019 the department’s Acting Chief implemented a community-oriented policing & problem-solving strategy (COPPS) which gave birth to a semi-focus police department. Shortly after implementing COPPS, the department re-created its proactive specialized units—gang, narcotics, vice, and human trafficking units—that afforded the department to implement a focused deterrence approach to violent crime stemming from group, gang, and drug crime. As a result, the frontline officers were reinvigorated and support for the program began to permeate throughout department ranks.

The third challenge occurred during the last quarter of the grant cycle—COVID 19 stay at home orders and social distancing requirements. The year-to-date homicide reductions met the goals of the project, however, the reductions slipped away due to months of quarantine then civil unrest. During the organize protest, the City’s contractors assisted in keeping the peace until the team was overwhelmed with rioters after sunset. As the stay at home orders and social distancing were in effect, our street teams conducted hot spot outreach and provided community members with mask and basic necessities such as groceries donated from local food banks as a strategy to engage active groups and high risk individuals. During this time, the program was successful in securing ceasefire, non-aggression agreements between rival groups but for obvious reasons faced challenges proactively engaging non-group involved individuals. During this time, the City, much like other cities, experience in violent crime stemming from personal domestic disputes. The fact that some individuals impacted by
gun violence were not attached to a group, gang or crew, did not preclude the project from following up to offer victim services.

The experience of working through these challenges among others, the city learned it cannot implement a focused deterrence-street outreach violence reduction strategy without a well-structured proactive police department. The City also learned that despite the lack of political and frontline officer support, community support and advocacy for a well-structured partnership-based violence reduction strategy can prevail.

While it is too soon to determine the strategy’s long-term impact on violence reduction there are reductions as a result of the reorganizing of the police department to support a focused deterrence, community-based supportive service strategy. Although the reductions met the goals we have set for the program, we need to continue the work in order to increase and sustain reductions to meet state and national standards.

The project accomplishments highlights include but are not limited to:

**Built a foundation for using facts to inform action and guide the investment of limited public resources.** Building on its earlier problem analysis the CPSC worked with the City’s Violence Intervention Program partners—Victory Outreach of San Bernardino, Young Visionaries Youth Leadership Academy, and Clay Counseling Solutions—to complete a needs assessment and worked with the San Bernardino police department to undertake regular “shooting reviews” (real-time data collection and problem assessments).

- Although not grant funded, the city conducted a systematic review of 111 of the homicides that took place in the city from January 2015 through June 2017. These incidents directly involved 189 individuals, including victims and shooters. The review examined: (a) the circumstances of the incident; (b) the demographics of the individuals directly involved, and their criminal justice system involvement; (c) the role of networks and relationships in increasing the risk of violence; and (d) the concentration of violence throughout the city.

- Utilizing grant funded outreach workers and case managers, the city developed and carried out an assessment survey consisting of face-to-face interviews with 110 high-risk individuals in the City of San Bernardino. The survey findings focus on the 38 percent of respondents (42 individuals) who were at very highest risk of involvement in violence as victims or suspects. The survey employed a participatory research model designed to obtain critical information on the service needs of this especially hard-to-reach population.

**Developed and strengthened services and supports through a series of intensive workshops.** Specifically, this included intervention and case-management and life
coaching functions designed to reduce individuals’ risk of involvement in violence as suspects or victims.

The City strategy includes violence intervention and intensive case management functions – which draw on best practice and emerging research findings, including trauma-informed cognitive behavioral therapy, and are tailored to an especially high-risk population. These practice approaches, for example, feature small caseloads, multiple high-quality contacts each week, and the use of case management tools.

The strategic priority for the City at any given time is now determined through a data-driven collaboration (subject to extensive confidentiality protocols). Using the assessment of risk developed in Shooting Reviews, the VIP field staff and supervisors meet to develop a shared understanding of the risk assessments and begin the process of mobilizing a wide range of services and supports crucial to reducing that risk on a rapid timetable. These presentations follow strict confidentiality protocols and include descriptions of actively violent groups and conflicts.

Following the coordination meeting, the field supervisors now convene a planning meeting at which interventionists and case managers identify short-term steps to reduce the risk to these individuals. As with Shooting Reviews, this is an exploratory but purposeful process that draws on the expertise and experience of outreach workers to tailor interventions to an individual, community conflict, or group.

Conducted a VIP call-in aka sit-down, which consists of the direct, respectful communication of a proven-effective “risk and opportunity” message to individuals at highest risk of violence. Direct, respectful communication of an anti-violence message – which includes information about the risks associated with violence and the opportunities to step away from it – is central to the VIP strategy. This messaging takes place via small-group meeting known as “call-ins” or, more recently, “sit-downs.” CPSC supported and partnered closely with the VIP partners to convene a successful initial call-in. This meeting was a key milestone in implementation. The agenda consisted of the following.

- **The setting.** The meeting was convened at Victory Outreach. About 25 people participated in this meeting: (a) twelve people at high risk, the focus of the meeting; (b) eight speakers, a mix of community leaders, criminal justice agency representatives, and former clients, who each spoke for about three minutes; and (c) six to eight outreach workers, service providers, and other supporters.

- **The message.** The speakers shared their commitment to keeping the young men alive and out of jail and prison, while providing clear information about the risks of violence and incarceration. In addition, outreach workers shared their “24/7” commitment to help participants reduce risk and realize the goals they have for their lives and their families. Though the information about risk was bracing but the tone was conversational, and the speakers avoided lecturing or sermonizing.
Services. The overall agenda, the messaging, and the meeting logistics are designed to increase the likelihood that participants will engage in services—that is, this section of the meeting is carefully designed to function as an intake process that results in engagement in follow-up services specifically designed to reduce the risk of violence. The backbone of this follow-up process is a “safety plan” that systematically identifies and guides the development of responses to the sources of risk. A key objective of this operational component is to steadily increase the service-engagement rate.

Developed strong partnership-based management processes.
The VIP enforcement and service partners now convene a cycle of weekly meetings that generate quick, well-planned responses to violence. In San Bernardino, the focus has to be this continuous and intensive: A dangerous violent incident takes place almost every day and rapidly spurs retaliatory shootings and other violence.

The VIP community-based service provider completed 13,000 hours of follow activities and supportive services to a total of 250 individuals at risk of involvement in violence. Working with the VIP program manager and CPSC, contractors have steadily strengthened and increased their capacity to serve the City’s highest risk population. Out of the 185 people served, 90 received comprehensive service provisions that include life and safety plans for immediate family. The other 95 received short term services addressing their immediate needs or connecting them to services beyond the scope and capacity of the program.

San Bernardino Police Department Reorganization
Changes to the structure of the department, to include the addition of five Community Policing Districts, have strengthened the Department’s ability to respond to violent trends. These changes include:

- Establishing the Special Investigations Unit, which is now data and intelligence driven, plain-clothes unit specifically developed to focus on gangs and gang violence.
- Re-establishing a street-level Vice & Narcotics unit with a specific mission to focus their enforcement efforts on the gangs and or individual members of those gangs most at risk for violence.
- Establishing a selection process for proactive units based primarily on merit and the perspective officer’s tenure.
- Providing proper equipment and training to members of investigative units allowing them to be as proficient as possible in investigating violent crimes.
- Establishing a plan to build out an additional special investigative unit to address issues of Human Trafficking and the violence and blight associated with it.
- Setting in place strategies to increase the capabilities of the Department’s Intelligence Unit.

Strengthening Community Partnerships & Strategy Impact
While strong community partnerships have always been a priority a focused effort has been made by the San Bernardino Police Department to bolster existing relationships with a focus on increasing the effectiveness of the Violence Intervention Program (VIP). Leveraging these relationships to establish a united front against violence in the City is a cornerstone of the program and therefore became a top priority for the Department. As a result, the City noticed a significant improvement is coordination of public safety resources.

The most impactful change as a result of the departments restructuring effort is the department’s homicide clearance rate. The year to date change is 30 percent increase in homicide clearance and by the end of 2019 had a 75 percent violent crime clearance rate. In the first quarter of 2020, the Department's clearance rate was at 70 percent.

**Project Description**

VIP is intended to respond to chronically high levels of violence in the City of San Bernardino. Violence has been a serious problem in San Bernardino for more than 30 years. Over this period, the homicide rate has been 2-5 times higher than state and national rates. The City, working with the CPSC, has undertaken an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of violence a summary in the City.

- Violence is a serious, longstanding problem in San Bernardino. Gun violence has been a serious problem in San Bernardino for more than 30 years. Over this period, the homicide rate in San Bernardino has been 2-5 times higher than state and national rates.

- Young men of color are at highest risk of involvement in violence. Young black men make up the largest group of homicide victims and suspects, significantly exceeding their proportion in San Bernardino’s overall population. Young Hispanic men make up the second largest group. The average age of individuals directly involved in violence is 31 and 72 percent of those involved are between the ages of 18 and 34. Only 6.5 percent are juveniles.

- Criminal justice system involvement for those at risk of violence is significant. About 82 percent of all individuals involved in homicides have been involved in the criminal justice system. On average, these individuals have been arrested over 8 times and almost 50 percent have been convicted of a felony. Just over 38 percent were on probation or parole at the time of the incident.

- Groups such as gangs, crews and sets are associated with at least two-thirds of all the homicides in San Bernardino. These groups range from formal, intergenerational gangs to small, informal crews in which membership may be fluid. Groups not only play a role in traditional gang-on-gang conflicts but are also involved in a variety of disputes and crimes.
A small number of individuals generate a large proportion of the violent crime in San Bernardino. Even though the number of individuals that are members of or associated with these groups reaches into the thousands, a relatively small number—between 50 and 200—are actively violent at any one time. These individuals are involved in, at least, two-thirds of the homicides in San Bernardino.

The following is an overview of the City’s coordinated approach with a focus on the VIP Outreach, Intervention, and Support components.

VIP employs the efforts of community leaders, outreach workers, service providers and criminal justice agencies to:

1. Analyze serious violent incidents and trends to identify individuals at highest risk of violence.
2. Respectfully communicate the risks associated with violence and incarceration to them through alliances of community leaders and integrate these efforts with those of intervention workers focused on the assessment and implementation of intervention strategies based on community knowledge and the systematic analysis of violence.
3. Combine supportive relationships and intensive case management to build credible pathways to safety and opportunity for highest risk individuals; and
4. Focus intelligence-driven enforcement efforts on those individuals who persist in violence, creating a danger to themselves and other community members.

These partnership-based approaches are strikingly effective but difficult to implement if the City, its police department, and community are not in accord.

Data Collection
The City collected data for the problem analysis as foundational data to develop a city-wide strategy. The project collected victim-perpetrator demographic and circumstantial data related homicides and shootings on a real-time basis—week to week throughout the grant cycle.

The City also collected data via high risk participant needs assessment survey. In collaboration with the National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform and Hope & Heal Fun the City was provided with a “cost of violence” analysis in the City of San Bernardino as a tool to demonstrate “time-cost savings” for reductions in homicides and non-fatal shootings.

As stated in the executive summary, the City police department experienced a capacity reduction and as a result did not collect or track group related incidents until 2018 and tracked throughout the duration of the grant cycle. This process provided insight into
trends, community dynamics, and trends in violence but it enhanced strategic enforcements and street outreach in the natural environment, specifically in hot communities throughout the city. The city also used this data to compare to initial problem analysis.

Research Design
As a research partner and technical assistance provider, the CPSC used a mixed methods approach—qualitative and quantitative data collection—to evaluate the VIP, goals and objectives once intervention outreach and intensive case management services. In addition, a quasi-experimental design was used to determine whether shooting trends involving gangs and other criminally-active groups that experienced Violence Intervention Program treatments were reduced relative to shooting trends involving gangs / groups that did not experience Violence Intervention Program treatment.

Problem analysis research revealed that there were 21 active gangs / groups in San Bernardino between 2015 and 2017. There were 7 gangs / groups directly treated by Violence Intervention Program intervention after the 2019 launch of the program. Social network analysis revealed 6 gang / groups connected to treated gangs / groups through conflicts and alliances (i.e., vicarious treatment). The identification of these socially connected gangs / groups provided an opportunity to determine whether the Violence Intervention Program generated “spillover” violence reduction impacts on these untreated gangs / groups.

Results and Conclusions
Utilizing shoot review analysis and service coordination victim-perpetrator demographic data the city learned that initial data collected during the 2015-2017 study period remains true. While certain things remain the same, the project made an impact on the gun violence city-wide. In doing so, the project demonstrated its added value to public safety and with the community’s support, the political will remains stable in support of the violence intervention program.

- Implementation team remained focused on the 7 active groups and 6 “spill over” groups in alliance with 2 of the 7.

- Young men of color remain at highest risk of involvement in gun violence. Young black men make up the largest group of homicide victims and suspects. Young Hispanic men make up the second largest group. Young Black and Brown adults represent 95 percent of gun homicides.

- The average age of individuals directly involved in violence is 29 and 82 percent of those involved are between the ages of 18 and 35. Only 8 percent are juveniles.
Criminal justice system involvement for those at risk of violence is significant. About 72 percent of all individuals involved in homicides have been involved in the criminal justice system.

Just over 10 percent were on probation or parole at the time of the incident—this is 28 percent lower than in 2015-2017.

Groups such as gangs, crews and sets are associated with half of all the homicides in San Bernardino—one third reduction when compared to 2015-2017 study data. Through work with one major group the team was able to impact three cliques and secure non-aggression agreements.

Using the data collected in 2018 crime stats as the baseline data to compare pre/post interventions, the City experience a year to date 10 percent reduction in overall homicides—49 homicides in 2018 and 44 in 2019. This represents a conservative estimate of 5 million dollars in “time-cost” savings.

As it relates to group motivated violence, the City experienced an 11 percent reduction—26 in 2018 and 23 in 2019.

The City also experienced a year to date 14 percent reduction in overall aggravated assaults with a firearm—592 in 2018 and 507 in 2019. This represents a conservative estimate of 3 million in “time-cost” savings.

The overall reductions also represent a slight burden reduction on the regional criminal justice system that has historically been over burden gun violence, lack of police and prosecutorial capacity.

The project developed critical relationships in the City police department, County Probation department, State parole and community teams (P.A.C.T), and non-contracted local service providers.

Participants were provided with interventions guided by risk and need assessments at time of intake. Participants were provided feedback on progress made on their individual service plan (ISP). Implementation teams were trained on motivation interviewing to enhance participant success in fulfilling goals identified in the ISP. VIP service provider provided skill training with directed practice in life skills, three types of forklifts and OSHA certification. VIP Street Teams also engaged participants in ongoing support in their communities as an accountability and motivation opportunity.

90 percent of program participants did not get revictimized or re-offended. 10 percent of program participants violated their parole conditions for not reporting on time and turned themselves in to State parole—these participants also
requested that their assigned case manager assist in notifying family and accompany them to the parole office.

- As a result, the City committed to securing funding to fill the financial gap created by COVID 19 which cause CalVIP-3 RFP to be pushed back three months. In June 2020, the Mayor and City Council approved a three-month extension for VIP supportive service providers.

While the project goals, objectives, and accomplishments were recognized by city, state, and federal representatives there remains strong desire to create and institutionalize a well-funded comprehensive violence reduction strategy that not only offers intervention services for young adults but offer re-entry, primary and secondary prevention services.
### Program: San Bernardino Violence Intervention Program

**Goals:**
1. Reduce Homicides & Shootings by 5% per year.
2. Reduce harm & recidivism among program participant by 20% over grant cycle.

**Objectives:**
1. A) Conduct custom notifications and call ins. B) Engage 50% of participants with supportive services
2. A) Increase CBO capacity to provide outreach and supportive services B) Engage 50% of individuals identified in shooting reviews and coordination meetings in ongoing outreach & support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Service Providers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal 1 Activities</th>
<th>Goal 2 Activities</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Develop and convene weekly shooting reviews to ID very highest risk groups and individuals.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Convene weekly coordination meetings with partner CBO’s and clergy leaders to plan and implement measures for addressing active conflicts and building individual level interventions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Communication: Convene 2 call-ins in year 1; Convene 4 call-ins in yr. 2. Carry out 1-2 custom notifications per week.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conduct semi-monthly performance mgt. reviews to ensure quality implementation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Training and capacity building plans are developed and implemented by VIP core partners.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Carry out 4 in-person high quality contacts with VIP ”clients” on a weekly basis.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. As part of life plans, develop safety measures (safety plans) for 75% of all high risk clients.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Participating CBO’s will convene weekly case management meetings in partnership with technical assistance providers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP Manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Partnership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB City Police Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO Outreach &amp; Case management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals at the highest risk of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Term</th>
<th>Long Term</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5% reduction in homicides and shooting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% reduction in recidivism and harm among program participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased capacity for contracted CBOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% reduction in homicides and shootings (post grant cycle)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45% reduction in recidivism and harm among program participants (post grant cycle)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase trust between community and SB City Police (post grant cycle)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Intake assessments |
| Participant Self Reporting |
| Participant Focus groups |
| Participant Surveys |
| Crime stats year to date |
| Participant criminal history and life plans |
| Stakeholder collaboration analysis |
| Program development |

8/1/2018
City of San Bernardino Problem Analysis
2015-2017

Lisa Barao (Northeastern University) & Stewart Wakeling (CPSC)

February 2018
# Table of Contents

1. Introduction and overview (Slides 3-6)
2. Context and trends (Slides 7-14)
3. People involved in violence in San Bernardino: demographics (Slides 15-19), criminal justice system involvement (Slides 20-25)
4. Homicide incident analysis (Slides 26-32)
5. High-risk groups and networks (Slides 33-41)
6. Homicide density analysis (Slides 42 – 52)
7. Summary of findings; initial recommendations (Slides 53-60)
8. Appendices 1 – 4 (Slides 61-75)
Problem Analysis:
Introduction and Overview
Introduction and Overview (1)

• A problem analysis, based on data collection and analytical exercises, supports the design and implementation of violence reduction strategies.
  • It establishes a common understanding of local violence that guides civic, community, public service and criminal justice partners as they collaborate to reduce violence.
  • The analysis helps these partners tailor their approach to local dynamics and to individuals and groups at the highest risk of violence.

• Shooting reviews are weekly meetings that use analytic tools to develop and manage real-time violence reduction strategies.
  • Shooting reviews are described in more detail in Appendices 1 & 2.
• This problem analysis examined all homicides in the City of San Bernardino from January 2015 through June 2017 \((n = 111)\).
  • These 111 homicides involved 189 unique victims or suspects.

• We analyzed:
  • The characteristics of each incident
  • The demographics and criminal justice system experience of the people involved.
  • Groups and networks at high risk of involvement in violence, including their size, relationships, activities, and turfs.

• We mapped the concentration of violence throughout the city, including its relationship to turfs.
This analysis focuses on homicides (rather than including all shootings) because police departments collect their most extensive data on homicides. Some additional notes:


- The trend lines on Slides 10-14 (which correspond with those reported to the FBI) do include the mass shooting on Dec. 2, 2015, however.

- The 32- and 25-year averages (Slide 10) do not change when the Dec. 2, 2015, homicides are excluded. The 10- and 5-year averages (Slide 11) decline slightly (as indicated by figures in parentheses).

- The spike in homicides in 2016 may be related to the shootings on Dec. 2, 2015, but that one-year increase is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Context and Trend Data

- Homicides and non-fatal injury shootings have been a serious problem in San Bernardino for more than 30 years.

- The homicide rate in San Bernardino (homicides per 100,000 residents) has been 3 - 6 times higher than the state and national rates (see slides __ and ___).

- Homicide here has resisted national and state downtrends. The 25-year average homicide rate is 42, the 10-year average is 35, and the average homicide rate for most recent 5 years is 46.

- In the last 30 years, San Bernardino sustained its longest reductions in homicide from 1997-2001 and from 2008-2011. In both periods, the rate averaged just over 30, about triple the national and state homicide rate.
When homicides and non-fatal injury shootings are combined, there have been 1226 serious injury shootings over the past 6 years (Slide 12), an average of four per week.

Costs stemming directly from these shootings — for investigations, prosecutions, medical care, lost wages, and public assistance — amount to $284 million, conservatively estimated. The indirect costs to the local economy also are substantial.

The numbers of non-fatal injury shootings in 2013 and 2014 do not follow the local homicide trend line (as is typical) or the typical ratio of injury shootings to homicides (Slide 12).
Homicides 1985-2017

32-year average = 44 // 25-year average = 42
Homicides 2006-2017

10-year average = 40(39) // 5-year average = 46(44)
Homicide rate per 100,000 residents, 2008-2017: San Bernardino compared with California and U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>San Bernardino</th>
<th>California</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Homicide rate per 100,000 residents, 2008-2017: San Bernardino compared with California and U.S.
Homicide Victims and Suspects:
Demographics
Demographics of homicide victims and suspects

- Young black men (ages 18-34) make up the largest group of homicide victims and suspects, significantly exceeding their proportion in San Bernardino’s overall population.

- Young Hispanic men (ages 18-34) make up the second largest group of homicide victims and suspects, significantly less than their proportion in San Bernardino’s overall population.

- The average age of individuals involved in homicides as suspects and victims is 31, and 72 percent of victims and suspects are between ages 18 and 34.

- Juveniles make up 4.6 percent of victims and 9.1 percent of suspects, a lower proportion than is sometimes assumed.
## Homicide Victims and Suspects: Sex and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Victims (n=111)</th>
<th>Suspects (n=78)</th>
<th>Victims &amp; Suspects (n=189)</th>
<th>San Bernardino Population Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Homicide Victims and Suspects: Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Victims (n=108)</th>
<th>Suspects (n=77)</th>
<th>Victims &amp; Suspects (n=185)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 and under</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 and older</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Homicide Victims and Suspects ($n=185$): Age
Homicide Victims and Suspects: Criminal Justice System Involvement
Criminal Justice System Involvement: Summary Observations

The criminal justice system involvement of suspects and victims is very similar. About 80 percent have prior criminal justice system involvement (77% of victims, 90% of suspects). Of those:

• Just over 43 percent of suspects and 34 percent of victims were on probation or parole at the time of the incident.

• Both suspects and victims with prior criminal justice system involvement have been arrested 8 times on average before the incident. These arrests are for violent, weapons, drug, property and disorder offenses.

• Almost half of victims and suspects (49.4%) with prior system involvement have been convicted of a felony.
Criminal Justice System Involvement of Homicide Victims and Suspects in San Bernardino (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Victims (n=111)</th>
<th>Suspects (n=78)</th>
<th>Victims &amp; Suspects (n=189)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Known to CJ system prior to incident</td>
<td>85 (76.6%)</td>
<td>69 (89.6%)</td>
<td>154 (81.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of those known to the CJ System:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of prior arrests</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior probation/parole</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>78.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active probation/parole</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior incarceration</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convicted of felony</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Criminal Justice System Involvement of Homicide Victims and Suspects in San Bernardino (2)

- Prior Probation/Parole: Victims 78.8%, Suspects 78.3%
- Active Probation/Parole: Victims 34.1%, Suspects 43.5%
- Prior Incarceration: Victims 61.2%, Suspects 68.1%
- Convicted of Felony: Victims 48.2%, Suspects 50.7%
## Criminal Justice System Involvement of Homicide Victims and Suspects (3) – Prior Offenses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Offenses of those Known to the Criminal Justice System</th>
<th>Victims (n=85)</th>
<th>Suspects (n=69)</th>
<th>Victims &amp; Suspects (n=154)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed violent offenses</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed violent offenses</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons possession</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property offenses</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug offenses</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder offenses</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.88</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Homicide Analysis & Group Involvement
Group Involvement in Homicides: Summary Observations

1. We use the term “group-involved” because it: (a) captures the full variety of gangs, sets and crews characteristic of California cities; (b) includes not just group-on-group conflicts but also incidents in which someone’s association with a group increases his or her risk of violence.

2. The majority of homicides in San Bernardino involve group members as either victims or suspects or both (66%).

3. Many circumstances describe these incidents, but the largest categories are personal and group disputes.

4. Group members are also involved in a significant share of other crimes that result in homicides, such as robberies, domestic violence, and drug-related disputes.
Group Involvement of Homicide Victims and Suspects (1)

- Yes: 73 (66%)
- No: 21 (19%)
- Unknown: 17 (15%)
Group Involvement of Homicide Victims and Suspects (2)

**Victims (n=111)**
- Yes: 27 (24%)
- Unknown: 4 (4%)
- No: 80 (72%)

**Suspects (n=78)**
- Yes: 51 (65%)
- Unknown: 1 (1%)
- No: 26 (33%)
# Homicides, Group-Involved and Not Group-Involved: Distribution by Circumstance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circumstance</th>
<th>Group-Involved (n=73)</th>
<th>Not Group-Involved (n=21)</th>
<th>Unknown (n=17)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing personal dispute</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing group dispute</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instant dispute</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal group dispute</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug-related dispute</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Robbery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex trade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Homicide Circumstances:
% of Total Homicides; Distribution by Group Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circumstance</th>
<th>Prevalence among all Homicides (n=111)</th>
<th>% that involve someone group-involved</th>
<th>% that do not involve someone group-involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing personal dispute</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing group dispute</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instant personal dispute</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug-related dispute</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal dispute</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex trade</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Robbery</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Homicide Circumstances, Group Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circumstance</th>
<th>Prevalence among all Homicides (n=111)</th>
<th>% involving Group Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing personal dispute</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing group dispute</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instant personal dispute</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug-related dispute</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal dispute</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex trade</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Robbery</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
High-Risk Groups and Networks

(Sociograms)
1. SBPD identified 21 groups (gangs, crews, sets, etc.) that are currently active and at significant risk of involvement in violence in the city.
   a. These groups have an estimated currently active membership of 615 to 875 (0.34% of San Bernardino’s population).
   b. These groups tend to be primarily African-American or primarily Latino, though some are racially mixed.

2. Seven of these 21 groups were associated with 40 homicides out of the total 111 in the study period, Jan. 2015 to June 2017, or 36% (Slide __).  
   a. These 7 groups have an estimated currently active membership of 380 to 590 (0.24% of San Bernardino’s population).
   b. Four of these 7 groups – small, primarily African-American gangs, with a total of 75 to 100 active members – were associated with 24 homicides.
   c. The three remaining groups – Westside Verdugos and two subsets with a total ___-___ active members – were associated with 16 homicides.
6. During the study period, out-of-town groups were associated with an unusually large number of homicides (26, or 23 percent of the total 111).
   - Los Angeles- and Pasadena-based groups were associated with 14 homicides.
   - Nearby or neighboring cities were associated with 12 homicides, the majority of which involved Rialto and Colton groups.

7. Finally, 13 groups were associated with 1 to 2 homicides each, for a total of 16 homicides, or 12%.

8. At any one time, a relatively small percentage of the active members in these groups tend to be violent.
Groups Involved in Three or More Homicides

The graph illustrates the number of groups involved in three or more homicides, categorized by whether they were victims, suspects, or involved in both roles. The groups listed include California Gardens, WSV, LA gang, Cotton gangs, Dalman Heights, Touchmoney, Alley Boys, Pasadena gangs, Rialto gangs, Seventh Street (WSV), and Mount Vernon (WSV). Each bar is color-coded: orange for victims, green for suspects, and dark brown for both roles. The counts range from 0 to 12, with varying numbers for each group and role combination.
Groups Involved in Two or Fewer Homicides

- IE Projects: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- Lil Zion: 1 Victims, 2 Suspects, 2 Both
- Pomona gangs: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- Disneyland: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- East Side San Bernardino: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- Five Time: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- La Puente gangs: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- Manor Bloods: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- PPHG: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- Riverside gangs: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- San Gabriel Valley gangs: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- South Side Verdugo: 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
- Sur Crazy Ones (WSV): 1 Victims, 1 Suspects, 1 Both
Homicides Attributed to Specific Group Conflicts: Groups Involved

- Touchmoney: 6
- Alley Boys: 4
- California Gardens: 4
- PDL: 3
- Five Time: 2
- IE Projects: 2
- Seventh Street: 2
- Lil Zion: 1
- Motorcycle Clubs: 1
- Noe Luv (Rialto): 1
- Trey-57 (Pomona): 1
- WSV: 1
Homicides Attributed to Specific Group Conflicts: Group Conflict Detail

- Touchmoney v. Alley Boys: 4
- California Gardens v. IE Projects: 2
- PDL internal: 2
- Seventh Street internal: 2
- California Gardens v. Lil Zion: 1
- Five Time v. Noe Luv: 1
- Five Time internal: 1
- PDL v. Trey-57: 1
- Touchmoney v. MC: 1
- WSV internal: 1
Illustrative Pie Chart: Groups with more than three homicides

- California Gardens
- Delmann Heights
- Touchmoney
- Alley Boys
- WSV & Subsets
- LA & Regional Groups
Group Conflicts and Alliances

- Inland Empire Projects
  - PPHG
- California Gardens
  - Alley Boys
  - 18th Street Maze
- South Side Verdugo Flats
- East Side Verdugo
- West Side Verdugo
  - Seventh Street Locos (SSL)
  - Sur Crazy Ones (SCO)
  - Little Counts Gang
  - Manor Boys
  - Mount Vernon Gang
- Delmann Heights
  - Gangsters in Action
  - Five Time Crips
- Magnolia Estates
- Gilbert Street
- Lil Zion

GROUPS AND GANGS IN SAN BERNARDINO
AUGUST 2017

> = Conflict
> = Alliance
> = Unpredictable Alliance

www.theCApartnership.org
Homicide Density and Group Territory
Violent Crime and Group Territories: Summary Observations (1)

• Approximate territories or turfs for 21 groups and gangs active from 2016-2017 were identified by the San Bernardino Police Department.

• The group and gang territories identified cover 9.91 square miles, or 16% of the city of San Bernardino.

• Of the 111 homicides from January 2015 - June 2017, 34.2% occurred within gang territories/turfs.

• The idea of a “traditional turf” is evolving with changes in the housing market and new development. Few, if any, of the homicides that took place in this period were associated with a conflict over turf.
There is an unusually large hotspot in the center of Slides 44, 45 & 50 that is not associated with a specific local group territory/turf.

- If you define the hotspot to include the first three color gradations (red to orange), then it is about 2.6 square miles (4.2% of San Bernardino's overall land area) and 29 homicides (26%) occurred within these boundaries.

- If you define the hotspot to include the first six color gradations (red to lightest green), then it is about 7.1 square miles (11.5% of San Bernardino) and 46 homicides (41%) occurred within this area.

- Homicides in this area were associated with a mix of group and personal disputes, human trafficking, drug sales, and robberies.
Homicides: January 2015 – June 2017
Homicides: January 2015 – June 2017
Homicides: January 2015 – June 2017
Group and Gang Territories
Group and Gang Territories: West Side
Group and Gang Territories: East Side
Group and Gang Territories with Homicides
Group and Gang Territories with Homicides
Summary and Initial Recommendations
Summary Findings (1)

1. Violence in San Bernardino is a longstanding serious problem.
   • SB has averaged 44 homicides a year since 1985. During this period, the homicide rate has ranged from double to as much as six times state and national rates.

2. The city and its residents face this problem in the context of severe poverty and a lean city budget.
   • San Bernardino’s poverty rate is among the highest in California and higher than most “comparable” cites nationally. See appendix 3.
   • The city is transitioning out of bankruptcy and has limited resources to address this problem.
Summary Findings (2)

3. At the same time, violence has significant direct and indirect economic costs.
   - Conservatively estimated, the costs that stem directly from these shootings amount to $284 million over the last 6 years.
   - Additional indirect costs to the local economy are substantial.

4. San Bernardino’s violence problem is similar in some ways to those of other cities, but SBPD’s strategic and resource challenges are heightened by additional complexities:
   - The unusual role of out-of-town gangs;
   - The high proportion of victims not associated with groups; and
   - The large “hotspot” near the City’s geographic center.
   - (These factors are likely to be linked)
Initial Recommendations (1)

1. The findings in the problem analysis indicate using Shooting Reviews to understand and manage gun violence.

   (NOTE: For a detailed description of Shooting Reviews, see Appendix 1 (from December briefing to project leads) and Appendix 2 (excerpt from CPSC working paper).

- **Purpose**: These weekly meetings of knowledgeable practitioners tie “real-time” analysis of shootings to day-to-day management of violence and guide implementation of communication, service and enforcement components of VIP.

- **Timeline**: The three steps in developing and implementing Shooting Reviews:

  1. Initial briefing and formation of core SR working group;
  2. Weekly meetings of core working group over 3 to 4 months with a strong “developmental” focus; and
  3. Gradual incorporation of and coordination with key partners over 6 months.
Initial Recommendations (2)

2. The problem analysis also indicates several features of the design and staffing of the “outreach and support” component:

a. Outreach staff capacity is based on the size of the population of very highest-risk individuals.

b. Risk of violence is very high (as indicated by the homicide rate) in the city overall.

c. This risk is hyper-concentrated in a small number of groups (7) and individuals (175-200), as shown in Slides 34-41. Risk is highest among a small number of African-American groups (Slides 36-40) but it’s also significant for Westside Verdugos (the city’s largest gang) and its subsets.
Initial Recommendations (3)

(Design and staffing of outreach and support, continued)

d. 8 to 10 outreach staff will be needed, based on the numbers of: groups, individuals actively violent, and shootings in a given year that require a staff response.

e. Salaries, professional development and staff support should be designed to reduce turnover.

d. High turnover prevents formation of trust relationships with highest-risk individuals and partner law enforcement agencies.

e. Seeing a new outreach worker every few months reduces the credibility and effectiveness of the overall initiative.

f. African-American groups are entrenched and have an “extended-family” aspect that makes them wary of so-called “outsiders.” So outreach staff will benefit from having existing social networks that extend into these groups. This is less a factor with Hispanic gangs.
Initial Recommendations (4)

3. The findings in the problem analysis indicate several features of Case Management Capacity and Focus.

a. Outreach staff need to be supplemented by case managers who build long-term relationships needed to monitor risk of violence and support progress toward positive outcomes (see below).

a. Relevance of social and economic indicators. As an intervention strategy, VIP is not designed to address root causes. But the degree of poverty in San Bernardino suggests a strong program focus on developing financial stability and self-sufficiency, employment and education. See appendix 4.

• (continued on next slide)
Initial Recommendations (5)

c. Case management staffing is driven by the number of very highest-risk individuals targeted for communication in a given year.

- That number will likely be approximately 80 to 100 individuals in the first year of implementation.

- The goal is for approximately 75% of those individuals to enter a service relationship.

d. Based on the above (at 15 cases per case manager), there is a need for 4 case managers in Year One. In the long term, there will be a need for 6 to 8 case managers.
Appendix 1: Developing and Implementing Shooting Reviews
The role of shooting reviews in VIP (1 of 2)

It’s hard for a partnership to manage a problem when everyone has different ideas about it, and the dynamics of violence often differ from the public’s conventional wisdom.

1. Those “driving” violence make up a smaller group and often are older and better known to criminal justice agencies than we think (etc.).

2. Risks of substance abuse, gang affiliation, or poor educational outcomes often are mistaken for risk of violence. Distinguishing them is really important at the community level.
The role of shooting reviews in VIP (2 of 2)

We’re using two tools:

1. **Problem analysis**: an in-depth and comprehensive review of homicides that helps tailor the approach to local resources and priorities and develops a common understanding of the problem useful to diverse partners; and

2. **Shooting reviews**: real-time meetings of knowledgeable practitioners that tie analysis to day-to-day management of violence and serve as the foundation for the implementation of partnership-based violence reduction strategies such as VIP.

3. That is, this is the first of two initial steps in VIP implementation, along with the “outreach and support” work.
The basic components of shooting reviews

A shooting review is a three-part weekly meeting of knowledgeable front-line officers as a working group to analyze and manage recent violence.

1. **Incident reviews**: crisply paced but thorough reviews of shootings that focus on the people involved; the circumstances and motives; street networks; and conflicts among networks and the likelihood of retaliation.

2. **Strategy discussion**: brainstorming and problem-solving to produce plans for employing intelligence, communication, and enforcement — quickly — to address violence.

3. **Management**: the use of report-outs and performance metrics to ensure timely follow-through on the incident reviews and strategy discussion.

✓ Shooting reviews are not venues for the working group to update the status of an investigations or plan further investigative actions.
Your weekly management cycle might include the following:

1. **Shooting Reviews**: These weekly meetings are central to identifying the groups and individuals at very highest risk of violence and to organizing the efforts of service, community, and outreach partners around them.

2. **Coordination meetings**: At these regular weekly meetings, PD shares information on the risk of violence with closely aligned outreach and support providers and other service partners.

3. **Planning and case management meetings**: Agency partners plan for addressing priority conflicts and chronically violent groups and for individual-focused case planning and program development.

4. **Monday check-ins**: This crisply paced weekly conference call addresses weekend violence in order to fine-tune current plans and initiate prep for shooting review and coordination meetings.

   Recent research demonstrates that conflicts escalate quickly and retaliatory shootings rapidly follow. This generates the need for fast moving planning cycles.
Appendix 2: Working Paper Excerpts on Shooting Reviews
Shooting reviews bring together knowledgeable practitioners, most often police officers, to systematically analyze and respond to recent shootings. A team made up of senior and mid-level managers, working closely with a crime analyst and a researcher, facilitate the reviews.

The first part of the meeting involves a review of every shooting that resulted in injury (and many that didn’t) in the previous week. Participants review basic information about each incident, including the date, time, place, and people involved. The facilitator then leads the group through a series of analytical questions about the circumstances of the shootings and the motives of those involved. This process helps identify the individuals currently most at risk of being involved in violence. The goal is to broaden the focus from solving crimes to crafting interventions that can quickly interrupt cycles of violence and save lives.
The second part of the review consists of exploratory but purposeful planning for responding to identified risks. Facilitators lead a group discussion that gradually produces a plan of action. Plans are designed to reduce violence quickly while avoiding tactics, such as indiscriminate stop-and-frisks and buy-and-busts, that tend to focus on those at low risk of violence, sweeping them into the criminal justice system with little public safety benefit. Instead, these plans draw heavily on analysis, high-quality police intelligence, and strong community-police relationships to focus on the small number of individuals actually driving violence.

This planning and implementation process moves rapidly. The goal is to share the output of the shooting review – an accurate assessment of risk and the emerging response plan – with community and outreach partners as soon as is practically possible.
Appendix 3: Comparative table on crime and economic indicators
# Comparison of City Crime & Economic Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>2016 Homicide Rate (per 100,000 pop.)</th>
<th>Population Density (per sq. mi)</th>
<th>Median Household Income</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>Percent Below Poverty Line</th>
<th>Percent Female Householder w/ Children Under 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Bernardino, CA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,508</td>
<td>$37,047</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colton, CA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,435</td>
<td>$41,565</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fontana, CA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,871</td>
<td>$64,824</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland, CA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,921</td>
<td>$53,851</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rialto, CA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,653</td>
<td>$52,347</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockton, CA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4,762</td>
<td>$44,797</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salinas, CA</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6,712</td>
<td>$52,338</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baton Rouge, LA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>$39,969</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochester, NY</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5,859</td>
<td>$59,943</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4: Group-involved demographics
Age:
All Known Individuals Involved in Homicide (n=185)
January 2015- June 2017

- 17 and under: 12 (6%)
- 18-24: 57 (31%)
- 25-34: 65 (35%)
- 35-44: 22 (12%)
- 45 and older: 29 (16%)
Victims Known to be Group-Involved ($n=27$): Sex and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Victims Known to be Group-Involved ($n=27$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Victims Known to be Group-Involved \((n=27)\): Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Victims Known to be Group-Involved ((n = 27))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 and under</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 and older</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean Age 29.1
Victims Known to be Group-Involved ($n=27$): Age

- **25-34**: 13 (48%)
- **18-24**: 8 (30%)
- **35-44**: 6 (22%)
Suspects Known to be Group-Involved \((n=51)\): Sex and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Suspects Known to be Group-Involved ((n=51))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Suspects Known to be Group-Involved ($n=51$): Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Suspects Known to be Group-Involved ($n = 51$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 and under</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 and older</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Suspects Known to be Group-Involved \((n=51)\): Age

- 17 and under: 5 (10%)
- 18-24: 20 (39%)
- 25-34: 19 (37%)
- 35-44: 4 (8%)
- 45 and older: 3 (6%)
- 45 and older: 3 (6%)
Insight

INTO THE LIVES
OF SAN BERNARDINO’S
HIGH RISK POPULATION

A SURVEY REPORT BY:
THE CALIFORNIA PARTNERSHIPS FOR SAFER COMMUNITIES

2019
The Office of Violence Intervention Program commissioned the California Partnerships for Safer Communities to develop a survey/needs assessment tool for those potential high-risk individuals living in the City of San Bernardino.

The surveys were administered by the three VIP service contractors which include Victory Outreach, Young Visionaries, and Clay Counseling. The service contractors used events, outreaching and their community networks to recruit individual for this survey.
**TIMELINE**

- **FEBRUARY 2019**: Develop Survey & Needs Assessment Tool
- **MARCH 2019**: Data Collection Period
- **APRIL 2019**: Analyze Data and Report

**110 People Surveyed**

- **48** At-Risk Individuals
- **20** High-Risk Individuals
- **42** Very High-Risk Individuals

Focus of this report is on the Very High-Risk Individuals
DEMOGRAPHICS OF THOSE VERY HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS
### DEMOGRAPHICS

#### CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO SURVEY

**Race**

- White or Caucasian: 3%
- Black or African American: 60%
- Hispanic or Latin Descent: 34%
- Other: 3%

**Age**

- Under 18: 3%
- 18 to 24: 40%
- 25 to 34: 37%
- 35 to 44: 17%
- 55 to 64: 3%

- 77% are between the ages of 18 to 34

**Parents**

- 74% are fathers
- 33% have 1-2 children
- 37% have 3-4 children
- 30% have 5+ children
100% Have gang ties or associations

100% Been on Parole or Probation in last 5 years

60% Currently on Probation or Parole

Arrest within the last 5 years

- **BETWEEN 1 TO 3 TIMES**: 71%
- **BETWEEN 4 TO 7 TIMES**: 29%

Have you been shot?

- Yes: 44%
- No: 56%

A close friend or family member has been killed due to gun violence in San Bernardino?

- Yes: 12%
- No: 88%
THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION
### EDUCATION

**CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO SURVEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Have <strong>Reading Disabilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71%</td>
<td>Are <strong>High School Dropouts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Dropped out of H.S. but later <strong>received a GED</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Are <strong>Not currently enrolled</strong> in any type of higher learning program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FACT:**

There is a **70%** chance that an African American man without a high school diploma will be imprisoned by his **mid-thirties**.

**SOURCE:** THE HAMILTON PROJECT, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE MAY 2014 ([LINK](#))
EMPLOYMENT
WITH IN THE CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO
71% are currently unemployed.

86% are willing to take a job paying minimum wage.

Areas where people need assistance related to employment:

- Clothes, Tools for a Job: 62%
- Job Training: 68%
- Computer Training: 50%
- Other Vocational Skills: 41%
- Help w/ Resume or Cover Letter: 50%
- Help w/ Job Interview: 50%
- Help w/ Job Interview: 12%
EMPLOYMENT BARRIERS

**72%**
Never had any Job Training

**65%**
Don’t know where to get Job Assistance

**37%**
Could Not Pass a Drug Test

**49%**
Can’t afford daily Transportation

**49%**
Do Not Have a Calif. License
CHALLENGES
INDIVIDUALS ARE FACING EVERYDAY
**FINANCIAL CHALLENGES**

- **71%** Are *Currently Unemployed*

- **80%** Don't have a *bank account*

- **49%** Have *3 to 5 people* depending on them for *financial support*

- **30%** Responsible for monthly *Child-Support* averaging $480

**Other Financial Obligations**

- **37%** Owe *significant fines* for tickets or driving violations

- **32%** Owe *restitution* fines.

- **25%** Have unpaid *legal fees*.

- **30%** Owe back-child-support averaging $2,800.
**Housing Situation**

24% Have **unstable housing** situations

**What is your current living situation?**

- **Live in my own apartment**: 40.00%
- **Live with friends in my own room**: 14.29%
- **Live with family in my own room**: 22.86%
- **Live with friends on the couch or floor**: 8.57%
- **Live with family on the couch or floor**: 5.71%
- **Live in a shelter**: 5.71%
- **I’m un-housed**: 2.86%

**Neighborhood**

77% Feel they live in a very violent neighborhood

**Social Service Assistance**

37% Receiving Food Stamps or General Assistance

67% Household family members are receiving Food Stamps or GA.
ABILITY TO EAT

CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO SURVEY

Is it hard to get a hot meal to eat on a daily basis?

38% YES

How many meals do you eat each day?

39% Either don’t eat or struggle to find a daily meal

35% Eat 2 meals a day

26% Eat 3 meals a day
Have you ever committed a crime or stolen in order to eat?

74%  YES

Have you ever committed a crime or stolen to buy marijuana or some type of drug.

74%  YES
What are the top illegal ways people make money in San Bernardino?

- Selling Hard Drugs: 74%
- Selling Marijuana: 65%
- Pimping: 47%
- Home Invasions: 44%
- Breaking into cars for items to sell: 35%
- Breaking into Businesses: 24%
- Robbing Individuals: 47%
- Robbing Drug Dealers: 32%
- Gambling: 38%
- Extortion (Paying for Protection): 18%
- Other: 9%
GUN VIOLENCE
IN THE CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO
Do you feel it’s necessary for someone to carry a gun in San Bernardino?

- 56% YES
- 44% NO

What do you feel are the root causes of gun violence in San Bernardino?

- **Gang feuds** with in San Bernardino: 59%
- **Gang feuds** with *outside gangs* coming into San Bernardino: 53%
- Social Media feuds: 47%
- **Domestic disputes:** feuding over ex-girl friends and ex-boy friends: 65%
- Retaliation for shootings: 47%
- Race Issues: 47%
- Drug beefs: 47%
Have you ever had an argument with you (ex, spouse or significant other), that has escalated into violence or a feud?

80% YES
Do you have people you can call-on when you need support?

- **68%** Yes
- **32%** No

Who can you call on when you really need support?

- **Immediate family members**: 56%
- **Extended family members**: 21%
- **My immediate friends**: 44%
- **Members of my Gang or Crew**: 44%
- **A Community Organization**: 21%
- **My Church**: 21%
Where do you see yourself in 10 years?

**Successful**: Having a strong career, physically healthy and a beautiful family

Physically health and accomplishing some goals

**In the same situation I’m in now**

In jail or being arrested multiple times

Ether shot, stabbed or a victim of a violent crime

**Dead**

30% See themselves in a negative future circumstance.
What areas do you need assistance with?

- Finding Employment: 62%
- Vocational Training: 44%
- Assistance with Housing: 41%
- Assistance with Food: 32%
- Signing up for Food Stamps or General Assistance: 29%
- Other Social Services: 21%
- Signing up for SSI: 21%
- Counseling or talking with a Therapist: 26%
- Domestic Violence or Anger Management: 21%
What areas do you need assistance with?

- **Life Skills**: 59%
- **Child Support Issues**: 21%
- **Immigration Issues**: 6%
- **Paying off Legal Fees**: 24%
- **Financial Issues**: 32%
  - Budgeting
  - Money and Credit Issues
- **Conflict Mediation**: 6%
- **Legal Support**: 18%
- **Transportation**: 47%
- **Tattoo Removal**: 38%
- **Assistance with Higher Education**: 38%
  - (GED, H.S Diploma, College etc)
Insight
INTO THE LIVES
OF SAN BERNARDINO’S
HIGH RISK POPULATION

A SURVEY REPORT BY:
THE CALIFORNIA PARTNERSHIPS FOR SAFER COMMUNITIES
2019
San Bernardino is a city with a growing population, nearly a quarter of a million people, which was best known for being the location for the first McDonald's. The partially rural city is also known for being the largest jurisdiction at the time to file bankruptcy in 2012, and a mass workplace shooting in December 2015 that killed 14 and seriously injured 22. But it is the everyday violence that has recently gained San Bernardino the dubious distinction of being named the “Most Dangerous” city in California.

In 2019, San Bernardino had 47 homicides and there were 49 homicides in 2018. In 2018, California had a rate of 4.4 homicide crimes per 100,000 population. With a population of over 200,000 people, San Bernardino’s homicide rate was five times the state’s average homicide rate in 2018. San Bernardino residents also suffer from high rates of poverty. The City’s poverty rate is more than double the national average. With the City’s former bankruptcy filing and high poverty rates, spending taxpayers’ sparse resources on shooting and homicide response is dire.

When someone is shot in San Bernardino, there is an immediate, multifaceted, and very expensive response from an array of government agencies. The Fire Department dispatches EMTs, government contracted ambulances respond, several police units descend on the scene, investigators from the District Attorney’s office often arrive, and if the victims are declared dead on the scene, the coroner is called. All of this is only the shooting scene itself. Then there is a hospitalization often paid for by tax dollars and in the case of serious injury, a rehabilitation. Victim compensation is often provided. There is a protracted investigation by the San Bernardino Police Department (SBPD) and the San Bernardino County District Attorney. They are sometimes joined by the federal US Attorney. Most often there is a trial and a long incarceration period. When there are multiple victims and/or multiple suspects, these efforts are multiplied for a single shooting incident.

These are just some of costs of each injury shooting in San Bernardino. The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) was funded by the Hope and Heal Fund, which has invested in violence prevention efforts in San Bernardino, to conduct a detailed analysis and publish this Cost of Gun Violence study that documents the detailed government expenses that accompany every injury shooting in the City. NICJR tracked the direct costs of each shooting and has deliberately used the low end of the range for each expense. Additionally, not included in this study are the loss of production costs when the victim(s) or suspect(s) were working at the time of the incident. Nationally, those costs have been estimated at an additional $2 million for each shooting incident. Therefore, the calculated per homicide cost of $2.3 million in San Bernardino is a safe estimate, the real cost is likely even higher.

In the past five years, San Bernardino has had an average of 47 homicides. This results in an annual expense of $108 million.

In the past five years, San Bernardino has had an average of 47 homicides. This results in annual expense of $108 million. If San Bernardino could reduce its injury shooting rate by 20%, that could result in a combined government savings of over $21 million.

The City of San Bernardino and its police department has experienced diminished resources over the past few years. Shooting response and investigation is very time consuming. If police officers were freed up to focus on more service to the community, response times on all calls for service could improve, improved engagement with the community could be achieved, and all overall crime could be reduced. Savings from reduced shootings could
Once a victim has been transported to the hospital, the cost of the Trauma Unit, surgery and rehabilitation are exorbitant. Costs can range from $50k to $179k per incident. With more than two-thirds of gunshot victims either uninsured or on Medical, this puts a tremendous strain on the county’s hospital network.

Police investigation; a trial or court process that includes prosecution and defense costs; and court staff make up the many costs of the court process in injury shooting and homicide cases. And due to the heavy penalty of homicide convictions, these cases often go to trial. Sometimes these cases involve multiple suspects with multiple court dates and separate trials. From the time of arrest, the court proceedings in an injury shooting and homicide case can take two years.

The response to a severe injury shooting or homicide scene usually includes a heavy police presence, Fire/EMT response, along with medical transport. According to officials with the San Bernardino Police Department, up to 12 officers including Patrol, Homicide Unit, and Forensics respond to a typical homicide shooting.

Incarceration accounts for a large portion of the costs once a suspect is arrested. The San Bernardino County Jails cost on average $100 per day. Suspects can remain in the county system for two years until their trial, sentencing, and placement into the State prison system. The California State prison system cost $222 per day and can range from $643k to over $1.9 million to incarcerate individuals convicted of attempted murder or homicide.

The majority of these costs are covered by California’s Victim Compensation program. Costs can range from $7k to $35k and include burial expenses, lost wages for a year, medical expenses, and counseling. Other costs in this category include county Social Services, the cost of families losing a financial contributor and the cost of the autopsy.

California has a State Income Tax of 7.75% along with a combined State/Local Sales tax of 7.75%. When an injury shooting or homicide occurs, the State and County loses the ability to collect taxes (both income and sales tax) from the incarcerated suspects and homicide victims. Each incident can represent the lost tax revenue of two to three individuals, from 10 to 25 years.
The true governmental cost of gun-violence to the City, County and State.

### The Cost Per Homicide

**HOMICIDE COST**

- **Crime Scene**: $10,330
- **Hospital**: $50,400
- **Criminal Justice**: $180,183
- **Incarceration**: $1,940,669
- **Victim Support**: $58,884
- **Lost Revenue**: $155,000

**Total Cost**: $2.3M

**Per Homicide Shooting**

**Per one suspect**: $4.6M

**Per one family**: $1.1M

### The Cost Per Injury

**INJURY SHOOTING COST**

- **Crime Scene**: $6,648
- **Hospital**: $123,600
- **Criminal Justice**: $32,096
- **Incarceration**: $641,421
- **Victim Support**: $58,884
- **Lost Revenue**: $31,000

**Total Cost**: $871K

**Per Injury Shooting**

**Per one suspect**: $1.6M

**Per one family**: $122K

---

**San Bernardino, California**

The Hope and Heal Fund is the only state-based donor collaborative fund committed to a public health and community-based approach to prevent gun violence in California. Hope and Heal Fund prioritizes solutions through a racial equity framework to prevent, interrupt and intervene gun violence and the trauma inflicted as a result. For more information about the Hope and Heal Fund, please visit hopeandhealfund.org.
**Total Loss Sales Tax Revenue = $31,000**

If shooting victim doesn't work for one year, then an $27,900 of missed combined sales tax = $775. Total combined tax = $3,100

If person earns $30k/year, then State income tax = $950. Total income tax = $2,325

Average cost among competitive venders to clean up crime scenes involving blood = $2,500

**Hospital**

**Victim Support**

**Loss Revenue**